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Abstract 
We investigated whether motivated reasoning rooted in partisanship affects the attributions 
individuals make about violent attackers’ underlying motives and group memberships. Study 
1 demonstrated that on the day of the Brexit referendum pro–leavers (vs. pro–remainers) 
attributed an exculpatory (i.e., mental health) versus condemnatory (i.e., terrorism) motive to 
the killing of a pro-remain politician. Study 2 demonstrated that pro– (vs. anti–) immigration 
perceivers in Germany ascribed a mental health (vs. terrorism) motive to a suicide attack by a 
Syrian refugee, predicting lower endorsement of punitiveness against his group (i.e., 
refugees) as a whole. Study 3 experimentally manipulated target motives, showing that 
Americans distanced a politically-motivated (vs. mentally ill) violent individual from their 
ingroup and assigned him harsher punishment— patterns most pronounced amongst high 
group identifiers.  
Keywords: terrorism, mental illness, attributions, punitiveness, motivated reasoning 
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‘Terrorist’ or ‘Mentally Ill’: Motivated Biases Rooted in Partisanship Shape 
Attributions about Violent Actors  
It is often said that one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Just as 
perceivers’ motivations might lead them to disagree about the righteousness of a violent 
actor’s behaviour, so too might perceivers disagree about the roots of that behaviour in ways 
that either incriminate or exonerate that actor and align with perceivers’ worldviews. One 
dimension frequently debated when attributing causes to actors’ violent behaviour is whether 
it is rooted in mental illness versus terrorism. For example, following Omar Mateen’s 
massacre at the Pulse gay club in Orlando, a local imam emphasized Mateen’s mental health 
problems (Fox, 2016), whereas others focused on his potential terrorist motivations (Kassam, 
2016; Pilkington & Roberts 2016). Elsewhere, mainstream media has been accused of being 
reticent to describe White perpetrators (e.g., Dylann Roof) as terrorists (Butler, 2015; 
Greenwald, 2016). Sometimes the motive behind these violent acts is obvious. Often, 
however, it is ambiguous, allowing room for different motivated interpretations. 
These distinctions matter: an aggressor labelled a terrorist is likely to be condemned 
and punished much more than the same actor designated mentally ill, because the latter is 
attributed with reduced control and diminished understanding of their actions’ consequences 
(see M’Naghten Rules, Dalby, 2006). Indeed, perceivers’ negative affect and behaviour 
towards a stigmatised target or group depends on how much they are viewed as having 
control over the factors at the root of their stigmatisation behaviour (Schwarzer & Weiner, 
1991; Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 2011; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). 
Relatedly, how much an ingroup member’s behaviour negatively affects the 
reputation of one’s group depends in part on whether that member is viewed as in control 
of—and therefore morally responsible for—his/her harmful actions. To protect its status, 
group members may be motivated to distance their group from a violent individual. This can 
‘TERRORIST’ or ‘MENTALY ILL’   4 
occur via mechanisms such as denying the violent individual membership in the group 
(Kteily, Cotterill, Sidanius, Sheehy-Skeffinton, & Bergh, 2014), or— if membership is hard 
to deny— by framing the target as a black sheep (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). 
Alternatively, as we propose here, individuals may seek to excuse the behaviour by making 
exculpatory attributions— for example, framing it as caused by mental illness. Similar 
processes could underlie attributions about the causes of an outgroup’s behaviour: If 
individuals dislike or feel threatened by another group (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; 
Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2011), they may be motivated to impugn its reputation by 
making condemnatory attributions holding its members responsible for reprehensible acts. 
Taken together, attributions of motives to violent acts may be coloured by social bias 
embedded in the motivation to protect (impugn) one’s ingroup (an outgroup) or a favoured 
(resented) partisan position. Drawing on motivated reasoning accounts (Kruglanski & 
Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1990; Munro, Weih, & Tsai, 2010), we investigate whether perceivers’ 
partisanship predicts their attributions of motives (terrorism vs. mental illness) to violent 
actors, and consider the downstream consequences of these attributions for the violent actors 
and their ingroups. We tested these novel predictions across different geo-political contexts, 
involving two consequential and psychologically salient real-life events (Studies 1 & 2), and 
a controlled experimental study (Study 3). 
Motivated Reasoning in Ascribing Terrorism vs. Mental Illness  
Motivated reasoning perspectives suggest that perceivers’ investment in their social 
contexts leads them to select and filter information in a biased, self- or ingroup-serving 
manner to arrive at conclusions that favour their valued positions (Kruglanski & Freund, 
1983; Kunda, 1990; Munro et al., 2010). One illustrative study demonstrated that liberals and 
conservatives watching the same video of a protest saw protestors as aggressive when their 
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political stance purportedly opposed perceivers’ own but as peaceful when their stance 
aligned with perceivers’ valued position (Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, & Evans, 2012; see also 
Hulsizer, Munro, Fagerlin, & Taylor, 2004). Recent work has examined motivated bias in the 
context of broader ideological stances. For example, Kteily and colleagues (2014) established 
that White Americans and British participants were more likely to perceive racially and 
ethnically ambiguous low-status targets (e.g., Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev) in outgroup 
(vs. ingroup) terms when participants were higher in social dominance orientation and right-
wing authoritarianism (and thus particularly motivated to maintain the standing or norms of 
their high-status ingroup). Consistent with the idea that attributions about actors’ violence can 
have downstream consequences, perceiving these targets in more exclusionary ways 
predicted support for punishing them more severely.  
The Current Research 
We examine whether motivated reasoning extends to predict the (exculpatory vs. 
condemnatory) attributions that individuals make for targets’ violent behaviour — here, 
attributions of terrorism versus mental health made for violent perpetrators’ actions. We 
argue that when the violent behaviour could shed negative light on one’s valued partisan 
position, perceivers’ motivations will lead them to distance the perpetrator from these 
positions by ascribing the perpetrator an exculpatory motive (i.e., mental illness). Conversely, 
opponents of the same partisan position might be motivated to magnify the association 
between the violent individual and the position they are opposing by attributing to the 
perpetrator a more condemnatory motive (i.e., terrorism). Because terrorism represents an 
action on behalf of a political collective, this would also enable motivated perceivers to link a 
violent actor’s behaviour to his/her group membership, rendering the collective ‘guilty by 
association’ (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) and facilitating vicarious 
retribution (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006).  
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Study 1 
 Study 1 examined violence immediately preceding Britain’s heated national 
referendum vote regarding exit from the European Union. A week before the referendum, 52-
year-old Thomas Mair murdered Jo Cox, a British Member of Parliament known for her 
support of the ‘Remain’ campaign seeking to keep Britain in the E.U. Immediately after (and 
just preceding the vote), Mair’s motive remained ambiguous, with police investigating both 
reports of him shouting “Britain first” during the act – a reference to the ultra-right political 
party by the same name – and the possibility of his suffering mental health problems (BBC, 
2016; Pidd, 2016). To capture participants’ responses while events remained salient, we 
conducted Study 1 on the actual referendum day.  
We predicted that motivated reasoning would lead individuals to make biased 
ascriptions of Mair’s motives. Specifically, we expected Leave (vs. Remain) supporters to be 
more likely to attribute him a mental illness (vs. terrorism) motive. We further investigated 
consequences of these attributions for participants’ aggressive reactions towards Mair, 
focusing on punitive measures. A mentally ill aggressor is viewed as less in control of and 
culpable for the consequences of his/her actions (Dalby, 2006; see also Weiner et al., 2011). 
Thus, we reasoned that the more Leave (vs. Remain) supporters attributed Mair’s violence to 
mental illness (vs. terrorism), the less punitive they would be towards him.  
Interestingly, this context contained potential countervailing motives beyond 
partisanship. For example, due to their shared national identification with the (British) victim, 
Leave supporters might be motivated to some extent to condemn Mair (by labelling him a 
terrorist) so as to disassociate him from the national ingroup, a potential countervailing force 
to Leave supporters’ motivation to protect their partisan ingroup (i.e., the Leave campaign) 
by attributing his actions to mental illness. However, given the salience and divisiveness of 
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the referendum, we predicted that our participants would be more likely to process Mair’s 
action through the lens of political partisanship (vs. national identity; see Musgrove & 
McGarty, 2008; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Our sample comprised 234 British adults, participating online via Qualtrics Panels. 
Data collection commenced at 11:41 AM and completed at 16:33 PM on referendum day 
(June 23, 2016). We excluded 44 participants missing data on key variables (n = 28), being of 
mixed (n = 2) or non–British nationality (n = 9), or failing attention checks (n = 5). The final 
sample consisted of 190 adults (46% male; Mage = 44.96; SDage =16.70). Referendum 
position consisted of two levels: Leave supporters (n = 97) vs. Remain supporters (n = 93). 
Post-hoc power analysis revealed this study was sufficiently powered (power = .93; details in 
SOM). 
Measures 
Unless noted otherwise, all scales across studies ranged from 0 (‘not much’) to 100 
(‘very much’). Full measures, including those for exploratory analyses not reported here, are 
available in the SOM. 
Partisanship. After providing demographics, participants indicated whether or not 
they favoured Britain leaving the E.U. (1 = yes; -1 = no). 
 Attributions for violence. Participants were asked to fill the gap in the sentence 
‘Thomas Mair is a __________who killed Jo Cox’. Data were coded for references to 
terrorism (e.g., ‘extremist’) vs. mental illness (‘psycho’) (details in SOM). Beyond this subtle 
metric, two items measured participants’ explicit motive attributions (e.g., “I have no doubts 
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that Thomas Mair killed Jo Cox because he is: ‘a terrorist’ — ‘mentally ill’). The z–
standardized subtle and explicit measures were correlated, r(190) =.48, p < .001; we 
therefore created a composite whereby higher scores indicated more attribution of mental 
illness. 
 Punitiveness. Punitiveness was measured with three items, modelled on Kteily et al. 
(2014) (e.g., “Thomas Mair should be placed in solitary confinement for the duration of any 
time he spends in jail”; α = .66). 
Results 
As predicted, results revealed that Leave supporters (MLeave = 0.24, SD = 0.78) were 
significantly more likely than Remain supporters to attribute Mair’s killing to mental illness 
relative to terrorism (MRemain = -0.25, SD = 1.14), t(188) = -3.43, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .50, 
mean difference = -0.48, 95% CI [-0.76, -0.20]. Although results for punitiveness were in the 
expected direction—Leave supporters (MLeave = 60.27, SD = 23.59) indicated less 
punitiveness than Remain supporters (MRemain = 64.55, SD = 23.11)—this difference was not 
significant, t(185) = -1.25, p = .21, Cohen’s d = .003, mean difference = -4.28, 95% CI [-
2.46, 11.02].1 We nevertheless examined evidence for an indirect effect on punitiveness via 
attribution of terrorism vs. mental illness. Using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4), 
we observed support for this relationship (see Figure 1), suggesting that Leave supporters’ 
                                                          
1 Research suggests a link between right-wing attitudes and punitiveness (e.g., Kteily et al., 
2014). Given that the Leave campaign was associated with the political right (Moore, 2016), 
we considered, in an exploratory analysis, whether right-wing authoritarianism might be 
suppressing the link between referendum position and punitiveness. Leave supporters were 
significantly higher on RWA (p = .001); after controlling for this difference, we observed a 
significant direct effect from referendum position to punitiveness (p = .02, ηp2= .03). See 
SOM for details. 
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lower likelihood of attributing Mair’s actions to terrorism predicted less punitiveness towards 
him, IE = -0.05, SE = 0.03; 95% CI [-0.12, -0.02]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Indirect effect (IE = -0.50, 95% CI [-0.12, -0.02]) of Brexit referendum position on 
punitiveness towards Thomas Mair through motive attribution (mental illness vs. terrorism).  
Coefficients are unstandardized regression weights.  **p < .01; *** p < .001 
Discussion 
 Study 1 provides novel evidence that attributions of terrorism vs. mental illness to a 
real-life violent individual can vary as a function of perceivers’ partisan positions. Moreover, 
we observed an indirect (but not total) effect between participants’ partisanship and their 
punitiveness towards Mair via participants’ motive attributions. Notably, this occurred 
despite potential countervailing motives rooted in Leave and Remain supporters’ shared 
national identity as British.  
In a second real-life violent context, we examined these findings’ generalizability and 
explored consequences of the terrorism vs. mental illness attribution extending beyond the 
violent individual. 
Study 2 
Referendum 
position  
(1 = Leave,  
-1 = Remain) 
Punitiveness 
towards 
Mair 
Attribution of 
mental illness (vs. 
terrorism) 
 
-0.04 (-0.09)  
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Study 2 examined host-immigrant intergroup relations in Germany, who recently 
admitted almost one million immigrants (Weaver & Farrer, 2016). German public opinion on 
immigration has been divided, fuelled by reports implicating immigrants in several violent 
incidents. We examined our hypotheses against the backdrop of an incident in the Bavarian 
city of Ansbach in July 2016, in which Mohammad Daleel, a 27-year-old Syrian refugee, set 
off an explosive device outside a music festival, killing himself and injuring fifteen German 
civilians. As with Mair’s killing, the motives behind Daleel’s attack (i.e., terrorism vs. mental 
illness) were subject of debate (see SOM). Tapping participants’ immediate responses, we 
launched Study 2 one day after the incident and completed it within a week. 
We predicted immigration supporters (vs. opponents) would be more likely to deem 
the attacker mentally ill (vs. terrorist). We further tested whether attributing mental illness 
motives to Daleel might be associated with punitiveness towards his whole ingroup. We 
based this prediction on research suggesting that perceivers often fail to distinguish between 
guilty and innocent outgroup members (Doosje et al., 1998), and sometimes engage in 
vicarious retribution towards the entire group (Lickel et al., 2006). The present context again 
contained potential countervailing motives: immigration advocates more focused on their 
shared national identification with the (German) victims might feel motivated to impugn 
Daleel (a foreigner) by attributing him a terrorist motive. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Data collection commenced on July 25, 2016, at 20:05 PM, one day after the Ansbach 
attack, and completed on August 1, 2016 at 20:46 PM. We recruited 316 German participants 
from a distance teaching university and German media outlets’ social media pages. We 
excluded 38 participants due to being non-German (n = 24), failing attention checks (n = 13), 
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or admitting to not taking the study seriously (n = 1) (final sample: N = 278 participants; 
47.5% male; Mage = 37.12; SDage =13.90). Post-hoc power analysis revealed this study was 
sufficiently powered (power = .98) (see SOM).  
Measures 
Partisanship. After providing demographics, participants indicated whether they 
supported immigration (1 = yes; -1 = no) to Germany. Overall, 235 participants indicated 
being pro-immigration supporters whereas 43 were opposed, comparable to national 
proportions (see Zick, Küpper, & Krause, 2016). 
Attributions for violence. Participants’ attributions were assessed as in Study 1, 
adapted to the current context. Measures of subtle and explicit attributions were again 
correlated, r(276) = .57, p < .001, and thus z-standardized to create a composite (higher 
scores indicating greater attribution of mental illness). 
Punitiveness towards immigrants. As Daleel died in his attack, we did not assess 
punitiveness towards him as an individual (as we had with Mair in Study 1). To tap punitive 
consequences for Daleel’s ingroup (i.e., immigrants) as a whole, participants indicated their 
agreement with five statements (Armbrost, 2014) endorsing punitive measures against 
migrants and refugees in Germany (e.g., “I generally find the punishments handed out to 
criminal migrants and refugees too light”; reverse-coded; α = .88). 
Results 
Because the sample sizes differed between the two groups, we followed Delacre, 
Lakens, and Leys’ (2017) recommendation to use Welch’s t-test when testing for mean 
differences. Welch’s t-test offers a stronger control for Type 1 error rates when homogeneity 
of variance is not met, while being similarly robust compared to Student’s t-test when 
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homogeneity assumptions are met.2 Conceptually replicating Study 1, immigration supporters 
(MSupporters= 0.09, SD = 0.85) were significantly more likely than opponents (MOpponents= -
0.49, SD = 0.91) to attribute Daleel’s attack to mental illness relative to terrorism, Welch’s 
t(56.21) = -3.85, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.66, mean difference = -0.58, 95% CI [-0.88, -0.28]. 
Moreover, as expected, immigration supporters (MSupporters = 35.78, SD = 25.42) were less 
punitive towards immigrants following the Daleel incident than immigration opponents 
(MOpponents = 72.65, SD = 21.11), Welch’s t(66.39) = 10.18, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.58, mean 
difference = 36.87, 95% CI [29.64, 44.10]. Again consistent with Study 1, results from an 
indirect effects analysis suggested that attributions of Daleel’s actions to mental illness (vs. 
terrorism) helped to explain a part of the link between supporting immigration and lower 
punitiveness towards immigrants in the aftermath of the attack, IE = -0.11, SE = 0.03, 95% CI 
[-0.18, -0.05] (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Indirect effect (IE = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.05]) of immigration position on 
punitiveness towards immigrants through attribution of Mohammad Daleel’s motives (mental 
illness vs. terrorism). Coefficients are unstandardized regression weights. *** p < .001 
                                                          
2 Indirect effect analyses used regular regression/t-test in the absence, to our knowledge, of an 
equivalent for Welch’s t-test. 
Immigration 
position  
(1 = supporters, 
 -1 = opponents) 
Punitiveness 
towards 
immigrants 
Attribution of 
mental illness 
(vs. terrorism) 
-0.55*** (-0.66***)  
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Discussion 
Extending results to a second real-life, violent event, German participants’ attributions 
of terrorism versus mental illness motives to Daleel’s suicide killing varied depending on 
their immigration policy positions. Study 2 further highlighted that these attributions can bear 
consequences not only for the target individual, but his or her whole ingroup (Lickel et al., 
2006): the ascription of a mental illness (vs. terrorism) motive predicted the link between 
immigration position and lower punitiveness towards Daleel’s ingroup members. 
  Study 3  
Studies 1 and 2 provided (correlational) evidence suggesting that, when the 
motivations of a violent actor associated with their partisan position remain uncertain, 
individuals make exculpatory attributions (i.e., mental illness). If (as we reason) this 
behaviour is rooted in a desire to protect the ingroup’s standing, partisans should seek to 
distance the violent actor from the ingroup in other ways when his condemnable motivations 
cannot be denied. In our pre-registered Study 3, we directly manipulated the violent target’s 
likely motives (mental illness vs. terrorism) and then assessed the impact of the manipulation 
on the extent to which participants distanced him from their ingroup. We expected Americans 
would be motivated to distance their ingroup from a target when they were given more 
condemnatory (i.e., politically-motivated; terrorist) versus exculpatory (mental illness) 
motivations for the target’s actions. We examined distancing by assessing how much 
Americans deemed the target to be foreign, indexed by perceptions of his prototypicality and 
beliefs about his religious background. If distancing of blameworthy targets indeed reflects 
motivated reasoning to protect the ingroup, it should be particularly likely among strongly 
identified American perceivers, for whom the ingroup’s standing is most important (Lewis & 
Sherman, 2010; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). In a secondary analysis, we 
explored this possibility here.  
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Method 
Participants and Procedure 
This study was pre-registered with AsPredicted.org (http://bit.ly/2mppN8b). We 
specified a priori a desired sample size of 500 valid participants. We recruited 620 American 
residents from mTurk, of whom 509 successfully passed both attention checks (52.1% male; 
Mage = 35.44; SDage =11.17).
 
Materials 
All items were assessed on a 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’) scale. See 
SOM for all measures (including exploratory ones).  
American identification. American identification was assessed using a three-item 
scale adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995; e.g., “I feel a bond with Americans”; 
α = .90). 
Experimental materials. The experiment was presented as a study of how people use 
intuitions to make inferences about others (see SOM). Participants read a summary about a 
student (‘Mr A.’) arrested and charged for acting violently towards members of the public. 
Participants in the ‘mental health’ condition (n = 163) read that the violent individual’s 
medical records revealed bipolar disorder and anti-depressant usage. In the ‘politics’ 
condition (n = 177), participants learned that police records revealed his heavy involvement 
in campus political gatherings. Our design also included a control condition (n = 169) where 
participants were given no information about the target’s motives. As stated in our pre-
registration, comparisons between our critical experimental conditions and the control 
condition were secondary. For brevity, we therefore do not include these comparisons in the 
main text (available in full in SOM). Importantly, all analyses below comparing the terrorism 
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and mental health conditions are taken from overall regressions or ANOVAs using the total 
sample (i.e., including the data from the control condition). 
Measures of distancing 
Prototypicality. From among filler questions, participants reported their perception of 
whether Mr A.’s parents were probably born in the U.S. and about the extent of his love for 
America. As pre-registered, we formed a composite from these items, r(509) = .38, p < .001, 
with higher scores indicating greater prototypicality with respect to the American ingroup.3  
Muslim-ness. Given Islam’s status as a minority religion in the U.S. and its strong 
association with foreignness and distance from the U.S. ingroup (Selod, 2015), attributing 
Muslim-ness to a target also implies a form of distancing. Participants indicated whether Mr 
A. was “Jewish”, “Christian”, “Muslim”, or “Atheist”. To capture perceived Muslim-ness, we 
calculated a difference score between perceived likelihood of the target being Muslim and the 
perceived average likelihood of the target having one of the other three possible religious 
group memberships.4 
Punitiveness. Participants indicated their endorsement of measures to punish or 
rehabilitate the target. Two items assessed support for offering the target voluntary or 
compulsory counselling, r(509) = .47, p < .001. Three items assessed participants’ support for 
jailing the target across time periods ranging from one year of house arrest to a minimum of 
20 years’ imprisonment (α = .80). We took the difference score between these two scales as 
our index of punitiveness (higher scores = more punitive). 
Results 
                                                          
3 Results were very similar—albeit marginally significant (ps < .06)—for each of these items 
considered separately. 
4 Excluding Muslims in our sample (n =4) did not affect conclusions. 
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As pre-registered, we conducted planned comparisons between the mentally-ill and 
politically-motivated conditions (omnibus ANOVAs including control condition can be 
found in SOM). As predicted, individuals were significantly more likely to distance the target 
(i.e., deeming him non-prototypical and more likely to be Muslim) and to express greater 
punitiveness when he was said to be politically-motivated versus mentally ill (see Table 1).  
Next, we examined whether American identification moderated effects of 
experimental condition on our key variables, using PROCESS 2.16 (Hayes, 2013; Model 1) 
and specifying a multi-categorical independent variable (i.e., condition). To capture the three 
experimental conditions, this analysis employs dummy coding with two vectors (D1: control 
condition = 1, other two conditions = 0; D2: politically-motivated condition = 1, other two 
conditions =0). As predictors of the outcome measure, we entered American identification 
(mean-centered), D1, D2, and the two-way interaction between American identification and 
each of these two vectors. We compared the effect of experimental condition on the outcome 
variables at one standard deviation above and below the mean on American identification 
(note that the values reported below reflect projected means). As noted above, although 
results are taken from the full model, we focus here on the results relevant to comparing 
effects of the mental health versus the politically-motivated condition.  
Table 1 
Means and standard deviations of dependent variables by key experimental conditions 
         Experimental Condition 
 Mentally Ill Politically- 
Motivated 
  
Outcomes 
 
M (SD) M (SD) p-value 
 
Cohen’s d 
 
Prototypicality 4.34 (1.03) 3.97 (1.26) 
 
.003 0.32 
Muslim-ness 
 
0.23 (1.49) 0.61 (1.97) 
 
.036 0.22 
Punitiveness -0.60 (2.50) 0.04 (2.54) .023 0.25 
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As theorized, American identification significantly interacted with experimental 
condition (i.e., mentally-ill vs. politically-motivated) to predict perceived target 
prototypicality, b = -0.33, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.49, -0.16]. There were no significant 
differences between the mental health and politically-motivated conditions among low 
American identifiers (-1SD) (F < 1). In contrast, high American identifiers (+1SD) in the 
politically-motivated condition (Mprojected = 3.78) saw the target as significantly less 
prototypical of the U.S. than those in the mentally-ill condition (Mprojected = 4.66), mean 
difference = 0.87, SE = 0.18, p < .001, 95% CI [0.53, 1.22]. 
American identification also interacted with experimental condition to predict 
perceived Muslim-ness, b = 0.41, p < .001, 95% CI [0.17, 0.65] . There was no difference 
across conditions among low identifiers (p = .38). In contrast, high American identifiers in 
the politically-motivated condition were significantly more likely to see the target as Muslim 
(Mprojected = 1.16) compared to the mentally-ill condition (Mprojected = 0.19), mean difference = 
0.97, SE = 0.26, p < .001, 95% CI [0.46, 1.48]. 
Although there was a significant main effect of condition on punitiveness (see Table 
1), this effect was not moderated by American identification (p = .44). 
Moderated mediation. American identification moderated the effects of 
experimental condition on our distancing measures (i.e., perceived prototypicality to the U.S., 
and Muslim-ness) but not on punitiveness. We nevertheless examined (see Muller, Judd, & 
Yzerbyt, 2005, and the definition of prototypical moderated mediation), in an exploratory 
analysis, whether there was evidence of significant moderation in the strength of the indirect 
effects linking experimental condition to punitiveness via perceived prototyicality to the U.S. 
and Muslim-ness (entered simultaneously into the model; using PROCESS, Model 7, which 
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tests moderation of the a paths from the independent variable to the mediators). We observed 
evidence of significant moderation of condition’s indirect effects on punitiveness via each 
index of distancing. Specifically, the indirect pathway from condition to punitiveness via 
perceived prototypicality was significantly stronger among high American identifiers, IE = 
0.44, 95% CI [0.19, 0.81], relative to low American identifiers IE = -0.05, 95% CI [-0.23, 
0.09], index of moderated mediation = 0.17, 95% CI [0.07, 0.32]. The same was 
independently true for the indirect pathway through Muslim-ness: high American identifiers 
IE = 0.15, 95% CI [0.01, 0.38]; low American identifiers IE = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.03]; 
index of moderated mediation= 0.06, 95% CI [0.006, 0.16]. 
Discussion 
Study 3 broadened our findings’ scope, highlighting that perceivers’ motivations 
predict not only their attributions of a target’s motives as a function of that target’s partisan 
position, but also their attributions of a target’s group membership as a function of his likely 
motives. Just as individuals protect their partisan position by attributing exculpatory motives 
for violent acts by ingroup members, they achieve the same by distancing targets from their 
group when the motivations behind targets’ actions threaten the standing of the group. We 
thus highlight another mechanism—alongside work on the “black sheep effect” (Marques et 
al., 1988)—by which individuals can protect their group’s reputation. Notably, that this 
pattern was accentuated among strong group identifiers is highly consistent with the idea that 
these patterns reflect motivated reasoning. It also counteracts potential concerns that 
participants might deem the violent target foreign merely because of stereotypic associations 
Americans have between violent actors and foreigners: Whereas high American identifiers 
might well care more about protecting the standing of their group, there is no clear reason 
why they would be more likely than lower identifiers to be knowledgeable about this 
stereotypic association. 
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General Discussion 
Building on motivated reasoning research, two studies revealed that individuals varied 
in attributing exculpatory (i.e., mentally ill) versus condemnatory (i.e., terrorist) motives to 
the same violent target as a function of individuals’ partisan beliefs. A third study provided 
evidence for the reverse process, showing that individuals—and especially, high ingroup 
identifiers— were more likely to distance targets from the ingroup when their violent acts 
could not be excused as a result of mental illness. The attribution of terrorist (vs. mental 
illness) motives predicted harsher treatment of the perpetrator, and—consistent with work on 
vicarious retribution (Lickel et al., 2006)—their fellow ingroup members. 
Our work is the first to document how motivated reasoning influences the ascription 
of two specific motives—terrorism vs. mental illness—frequently disputed in many 
consequential real-world contexts (most recently, the Las Vegas shootings killing 58 people; 
BBC, 2017). Our results highlight the political importance and ramifications of this 
distinction: Deeming someone a terrorist says something not only about them, but about their 
group, and calls for different—more punitive— responses. Notably, we conducted our 
research amidst two important events as they were occurring, boosting confidence in our 
results’ ecological validity. 
We build on research highlighting the versatility of motivated perceptions (e.g., 
Hartmant & Newmark, 2012; Kundra & Sinclair, 2009). One important contribution we make 
is demonstrating that the impact of motivated partisan perceptions transcends ethnic 
boundaries (and associated potential countervailing motives). In Study 1, we found that 
despite our participants sharing an ethnic group membership with the perpetrator, their 
position on the Brexit referendum nevertheless predict their attributions of motive (terrorism 
vs. mental illness) behind his murder of an ethnic ingroup (but, for ‘Leave’ supporters, 
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political outgroup) member. Study 2 similarly showed that pro-immigration participants 
‘protected’ an ethnic outgroup attacker by assigning him a more benign motive (mental 
illness), despite the harm his actions imposed on ethnic ingroup members.  
One limitation of our work is its correlational design. Future work could 
systematically (and jointly) manipulate the ethnic and partisan group memberships of a 
perpetrator to more clearly establish their relative contributions to the ascription of motives. 
Future research could also experimentally manipulate perceiver partisanship in order to infer 
causality. Relatedly, we note that although we modelled punitiveness as a consequence of 
attributed motives on theoretical grounds (e.g., Weiner, 1980; see also Darley & Pittman, 
2003), our correlational data cannot rule out the viability of the reverse causal path.  
Future research could also consider the role of motive ambiguity. Here, the 
perpetrator’s presumed motives (or, in Study 3, group membership) were always ambiguous. 
It is likely that ambiguity is a necessary (or catalysing) condition for the impact of motivated 
reasoning to be observed. When an attacker clearly pledges allegiance to a terrorist goal prior 
to conducting their attack, even staunch partisans should be more constrained from attributing 
an exculpatory motivation like mental illness. Future work could systematically vary this 
factor, presenting participants with evidence that restricts (vs. invites) ambiguity (e.g., 
showing or not showing political manifesto at the scene of a mass shooting perpetrated by an 
immigrant to individuals who favour versus oppose immigration). Interestingly, even when 
the motive itself is unambiguous, individuals might seek to find other ways to protect their 
partisan position— for example, framing the attacker as a black sheep (Marques et al., 1988) 
or otherwise diminishing their centrality to the group.  
Conclusion 
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One person’s terrorist does appear to be another person’s mentally-ill: We 
demonstrate partisan bias in individuals’ ascriptions to violent actors of terrorist versus 
mental illness motives. These attributions are consequential, predicting punishment of the 
perpetrators themselves and attitudes towards perpetrators’ ingroup members. As partisan 
polarization continues to increase, better understanding the nature, flexibility, and limits of 
partisan bias— and how to combat it — is ever-more important. 
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